Three Questions on Logic

Question 1: What is right?

What is right?

• Is it right because many people recognize it?
• Is it right because an “authority” proposed it?
• I know that what has been tested by practice is right, but we can still ask: Is the experiment right? Are there problems with the experimental methods or instruments? Could it be faked? Have we repeated the experimental results? In most cases, if we haven’t, but simply believe the so-called authority, then what is right? Isn’t it just that authority is right?

1. Distinguish the types of “right” first

“Right” can actually be divided into two types.

One is judging whether a conclusion is correct. For example, math problems, experimental results, and code errors can usually be verified through clear methods.

The other is judging how credible a conclusion is. This is more common in daily discussions: people don’t actually design experiments, collect samples, or perform complete verification, but it’s not entirely a case of everyone just saying their own thing. Most issues can still be judged—through experience, evidence, common sense, and counter-examples—to see which statement is closer to the facts.

For the first type:

Level 1: Conceptual Level What do the concepts in the conclusion mean? Have they been swapped or equivocated?

Level 2: Premise Level What are the premises? Are they true or false? What is their credibility?

Level 3: Reasoning Level Does the conclusion follow from the premises? Is it deductive reasoning or inductive reasoning? If it is inductive, what about issues like correlation? This will be discussed in detail in “Question 2” below.

Level 4: Verification Level Is it allowed to be questioned? Can it be tested by experiments? If it is inductive reasoning, the test will not pass 100%; what is the pass rate/accuracy?

For the second type:

Whether we have reason to believe it is true depends on whether the evidence, logic, method, and testing process are reliable.

Evidence determines credibility, method determines whether the evidence is reliable, logic determines whether the reasoning is valid, and the ability to accept questioning allows errors to be exposed, thereby becoming “more right.”

2. Logic cannot be self-contradictory

For a statement to hold, it must at least not be logically self-contradictory.

For example, a person cannot simultaneously say:

“All experiments are untrustworthy.”

And say:

“I conducted an experiment to prove that all experiments are untrustworthy.”

This presents a problem of self-refutation.

However, logic is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. A statement can be logically self-consistent yet still not conform to reality.

3. Ability to be tested by the empirical world

A statement about the real world must correspond to reality.

For example:

Water boils at approximately 100°C under standard atmospheric pressure.

This is not because many people recognize it, or because an authority said so, but because it can be observed, measured, and repeatedly verified.

However, there is an easily overlooked issue here:

Experiments themselves can also go wrong.

Experiments may have instrument and measurement errors, samples that are too small, poorly controlled variables, or incorrect statistical methods. There may also be researcher bias, selective reporting, or even data fabrication, leading to results that cannot be replicated.

Therefore, a single experiment is not directly equivalent to truth. More reliable knowledge/relatively more correct conclusions usually come from multiple independent replications, open and auditable methods and data, and mutual support with other reliable knowledge.

Statements that cannot be proven or falsified cannot be treated as reliable facts

The problem with some statements is not that they have been proven false, but that they cannot be tested at all.

For example:

There is a mysterious force in the universe that is forever unobservable, undetectable, and will not produce any impact.

This statement can neither be proven nor refuted. It may exist as an imagination, belief, or literary setting, but it cannot serve as reliable factual knowledge that others are required to accept. If a statement cannot be tested at all, cannot be falsified, and cannot give clear expectations, then it is not necessarily false, but it cannot be used as a reliable fact.

Examples:

• You succeeded because the energy of the universe supported you.
• You failed because the energy of the universe is testing you.
• The market rose because of sentiment repair.
• The market fell also because of changes in sentiment.
• If something happened, it was destiny.
• If something didn’t happen, it was also destiny.

Rigor and Falsifiability

The above statements are not necessarily untestable. If they can provide clear definitions, observable indicators, specific conditions, and predictions that could fail, then they can be tested.

For example, if someone says:

When a certain measurable “market sentiment indicator” reaches a specific threshold, the probability of an increase in the next five trading days will be significantly higher than a random level.

If “sentiment” refers to quantifiable market sentiment indicators—such as investor confidence indices, panic indices, trading volume, implied volatility of options, or social media sentiment indicators—we can continue to refine the definitions of these data and then design experiments based on historical and future data to test them. The problem is that many superstitions or rumors do not possess such precise definitions that can be further scrutinized, let alone proven by experiments.

Processes and methods can be checked by others

If a viewpoint can only be confirmed by a certain person, a certain organization, or a certain mysterious channel, and others cannot check it, then its credibility is very low. Reliable knowledge has a characteristic: it is not afraid of being checked. We can ask: Can the data be made public? Can the method be replicated? Can counter-examples be handled seriously? Is there a correction mechanism?

This is also why authority itself cannot directly prove a viewpoint correct. But this doesn’t mean all authority is valueless—authority cannot directly determine truth, but the methods, peer review, independent replication, and correction mechanisms behind reliable authority can serve as indirect bases for judging credibility.

We believe a conclusion not simply because “an authority said so,” but because their conclusion is supported by evidence, their method can be checked, others can repeat the verification, and errors have a chance to be discovered and corrected.

The real question is: Do we believe in the status of the authority, or the evidence, methods, and correction mechanisms behind the authority? If we believe someone just because they are famous or have a title, that is blind faith in authority; if it is because their conclusion comes from public evidence, transparent methods, repeatable testing, and long-term correction mechanisms, then it is not simply “authority equals correctness.”

Ability to be questioned with high quality

If a viewpoint can only be supported and not questioned, it is dangerous. Reliable viewpoints should allow others to ask: Where is your evidence? Are there counter-examples? Are there alternative explanations? Is it possible to be overturned?

After a viewpoint withstands repeated checks—especially checks from opponents who are capable, sincere, logical, and evidence-based—its credibility increases. This is because supporters tend to be lenient, while opponents are more likely to find loopholes.

However, note that not all questioning is valid. Common invalid questioning includes strawman attacks, conspiracy-style skepticism, and double standards—always requiring the opponent to meet impossible standards while one’s own “supported” views do not have to meet the same standards. Valuable questioning must be logical, evidence-based, and method-driven.

Ability to predict, not just explain

Even if a statement can explain phenomena that have already occurred, it is not necessarily reliable, because many explanations are organized after the results appear. A stronger theory can not only explain the past but also give clear, testable expectations before things happen.

For example:

• Certain historical theories can explain well why a dynasty perished—factors like fiscal pressure, land annexation, military corruption, foreign invasion, climate change, and ruling errors interacting. But if it cannot explain in advance which combination of conditions will lead to the collapse of a regime with what probability, its predictive power is limited.
• Certain economic explanations can clarify why a crisis occurred after a financial crisis: asset bubbles, excessive leverage, insufficient regulation, or liquidity exhaustion. But if it cannot provide clear risk signals or probability judgments before the crisis occurs, it is somewhat of a “hindsight” explanation.
• Certain evolutionary explanations can point out why a certain behavior might have adaptive value, such as cooperation, jealousy, risk-taking, or mate preference. But if one only looks for “possible adaptive functions” after the results appear without proposing testable comparative predictions, it easily becomes an after-the-fact story.

These theories are not necessarily false, nor do they necessarily lack explanatory power; the problem is that explaining the past is much easier than predicting the future. If a theory only strings various factors together after the results have occurred, its credibility is limited.

However, predictions do not necessarily have to be precise. In complex systems, many theories can only give probabilistic predictions, trend predictions, or conditional predictions, such as in economics, psychology, climate, and the spread of epidemics. A more reasonable standard is: a reliable theory should provide testable expectations under clear conditions, or be significantly better than random guessing and after-the-fact rationalization in a statistical sense.

4. The second type of “right”: We are usually not discussing absolute truth, but arguing for higher credibility

But the problem is, most of the time we do not personally repeat experiments, check raw data, or redo statistical analyses. Authority can serve as a basis for reference, but we cannot blindly believe experts. How do we distinguish valid information? And how do we judge which arguments are more right? Besides the authoritativeness of the information, it is still about conducting the aforementioned audit of the full text of the information, which means the following five levels:

• Level 1: Manner of expression.
• Level 2: Premise assumptions.
• Level 3: Reasoning process.
• Level 4: Evidence/Experimental chain.
• Level 5: Information source.

Under the premise of clear expression and a basically reliable reasoning process, if a person can trace premises, evidence, and citation chains deeper, and better assess the reliability, scope of application, and reasoning relationships of each layer, then their conclusion usually has more reason to be considered more credible. Note: “Deeper” itself does not automatically equal “more right”; the key is whether the tracing is relevant, accurate, complete, and whether the level of information credibility in each layer can be identified.

If looking strictly at information sources:

1. First-hand data/Original files/Original papers
2. Systematic reviews/Authoritative guidelines/Official databases
3. Explanations from professional institutions/Expert interviews/Textbooks
4. Self-media interpretations/Blogs
5. User experiences/Short video clips/Group chat screenshots

The judgment of the correctness of certain arguments is the result of our comprehensive analysis of the above five levels within a logical framework. Therefore, it is possible that some short videos are much more correct than certain expert interviews, and some self-media interpretations are more correct than certain textbooks; for example, the science popularization videos of 3Blue1Brown are more reliable than some textbooks.

Question 2: What is logic? How is it measured?

Regarding an important concept mentioned above, logic: What logic is it? Is logic objective? How is it measured?

• A considerable proportion of people do not use logic when talking about things, but they themselves do not believe or admit that they lack logic, and even think they are the ones who have logic.
• Most people will not discuss logic with you (for example, whether an experiment is logical) and might even say you are being stubborn. So, do you actually have logic?
• Is it only the logic of a few people (a few scientists and philosophers) that is called logic? Today’s physical laws, mathematical theorems, and other so-called repeatedly verified theorems can actually only be understood by a very small number of people; most people don’t understand them at all and just follow them blindly. At the same time, they blindly believe in views that are logically contrary to these basic laws. Isn’t this a bit like saying only the logic of a few people is called logic?
• If there truly is objective logic, it seems that most people do not have rigorous logic, so how can its existence be proven?

1. What is called logic?

Broadly speaking, logic is the tool and study of whether reasoning holds and whether reasons support a conclusion.

Because for most things, we cannot deduce with certainty but rather deduce roughly; if the premises are true, the conclusion is merely supported and becomes more likely to be true, but is not guaranteed to be true. According to whether it is certain, we can divide it into two main categories:

Deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Of course, they are sometimes called deductive logic and inductive logic, and sometimes divided into formal reasoning and informal reasoning. They can basically be considered the same thing.

1.1 Deductive Reasoning: Does the conclusion necessarily follow?

The characteristic of deductive reasoning is: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. For example (from Introduction to Logic):

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

The form of this reasoning is:

Plaintext

All A are B.
S is A.
Therefore, S is B.

As long as the first two premises hold, the conclusion cannot be simply rejected. Deductive reasoning is concerned with validity.

A deductive argument can be formally valid, but the premises may be false. For example:

Plaintext

All cats can fly.
Little Orange is a cat.
Therefore, Little Orange can fly.

The structure of this reasoning is fine, but the premise “All cats can fly” is false, so the conclusion is unreliable.

Therefore, one must distinguish:

Concept	English	Meaning
Valid	valid	If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true
Sound	sound	The reasoning is valid, and the premises are also true

So the objectivity of deductive logic mainly lies in: given clear premises and rules, whether the conclusion necessarily follows does not depend on who says it, how many people agree, or whether you like it.

1.2 Inductive Reasoning: Does the evidence strongly support the conclusion?

Inductive reasoning does not necessarily follow, but rather: from limited observations, experiences, samples, and data, a general conclusion or probabilistic judgment is derived.

For example:

Plaintext

The 1,000 swans I have seen are all white.
Therefore, swans are likely white.

This conclusion is not necessarily true because black swans might be discovered in the future. A large amount of reasoning in scientific research is inductive. For example:

Plaintext

Multiple randomized controlled trials show that the drug group recovered faster than the placebo group.
Therefore, this drug is likely effective.

This is not saying “the drug is necessarily effective for everyone,” but rather: existing evidence has increased the credibility of the hypothesis that “the drug is effective.”

The objectivity of inductive reasoning does not require “the conclusion to necessarily hold,” but rather that when standards such as sample size, representativeness, control conditions, statistical methods, and repeatability are clear, the strength of the evidence’s support for the conclusion can be publicly evaluated.

Common problems in inductive reasoning include samples being too small or biased, treating correlation as causation, ignoring counter-examples and alternative explanations, and the conclusion exceeding the scope supported by the evidence.

2. The objectivity of logic is not equal to “most people can use it”

Logic does not hold because the majority believes in it, nor does it hold because a few experts master it. Its “objectivity” comes from the fact that once the rules are clarified, they do not depend on anyone’s attitude, identity, numbers, or emotions.

Logic itself can be objective, but humans’ ability to use logic is very unstable. These two things must be separated. Many people don’t understand calculus, but that doesn’t mean calculus doesn’t exist; many people cannot read sheet music, but that doesn’t mean the relationship between pitches is fake. Similarly, many people are illogical, but that doesn’t mean logic is not objective.

It’s like a scale.

One person steps on it and says, “I don’t recognize this number.”

Another person says, “Your scale is being stubborn.”

A third person says, “Most people think I’m not fat.”

None of these can change the reading on the scale. Of course, the scale might be broken. So we need calibration, changing scales, comparison, and public standards. Logic is the same; it requires clarifying rules, checking reasoning, and sorting out premises.

3. Is it only the logic of a few people (scientists) that is called logic?

A small number of people may be more willing, more capable, and more trained to follow logical rules; it is not that only their logic is called logic.

This is similar to sports. Ordinary people running also counts as running, but professional athletes know better how to reduce wasted motion, how to measure performance, and how to avoid illusions. Similarly, mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers are trained to know how to handle definitions, premises, counter-examples, and levels of evidence, but this does not mean only their reasoning counts as reasoning. The key lies in: can what he says be taken apart and checked?

An ordinary person can speak with very rigorous logic, and a Nobel Prize winner can talk nonsense outside their professional field; philosophers make low-level fallacies, and people without degrees can grasp key contradictions. Logic doesn’t recognize ID cards or titles; it only checks the structure.

4. Most people blindly believe in science—does this mean science is just the faith of a few?

There are two levels here. For most ordinary people, science is indeed often “rational trust,” not personal verification. For example, relativity, quantum mechanics, vaccine mechanisms, semiconductor principles, cryptography, and modern astrophysics—most people indeed cannot fully verify them.

They believe, often because textbooks say so, experts say so, technical products actually work, and social systems recognize them. There is indeed a “chain of trust” involved, so the belief many people have in science is not belief after direct understanding, but trust in the community of knowledge.

This is not the ideal state, but it is not pure blind faith either. Because modern knowledge is too vast, it is impossible for anyone to personally verify everything—physicists must believe doctors when they are sick, doctors must believe engineers when they fly, and engineers must believe mathematicians when they use statistics. Modern society runs on “distributed trust”; the key issue is not whether to trust others, but whether this trust has a correction mechanism.

5. What is the difference between the scientific community and religious-style blind faith?

Ideally, the scientific community has multiple mechanisms: public papers, peer review, independent replication, theoretical competition, as well as the ability for failures to be exposed, for fraud to be held accountable, and for new theories to overturn old ones.

These mechanisms are not perfect; there are interests, factions, fraud, padding, arrogance, and power structures within them. But the difference between it and pure authoritative faith is: scientific conclusions are, in principle, allowed to be challenged by anyone using methods. You don’t need to be an aristocrat, you don’t need a divine oracle, and you don’t need to be authorized by a certain sect—as long as you have checkable evidence and sufficiently rigorous methods.

Of course, in reality, resources are unequal, experimental equipment is expensive, and publication mechanisms have thresholds; but in principle, it is not maintained by “someone being beyond question.”

6. Do most people believe in contradictory things at the same time?

Yes, it is very common. A person can say “I believe in science” while believing a certain metaphysical statement without evidence is very accurate; they can say “I believe in freedom” but feel that others should shut up as long as they disagree; they can consider themselves logical but say you are being stubborn as soon as you continue to ask questions.

The human brain is not a proof machine, but a hybrid system: a bit of rationality, a bit of habit, a bit of fear, a bit of identity, a bit of face-saving, and a bit of group belonging. What many people call “using logic” is actually just finding a set of explanations for their own views that makes them feel comfortable.

7. Then how to measure whether a person or an argument is logical?

First, are the concepts clear?

For example, he says “Science cannot explain everything.”

Then one must ask:

• What does “science” refer to?

• What does “explain” refer to?

• What does “everything” include?

• Is it unexplainable for now, or unexplainable in principle?

Second, are the premises laid out?

Many people hide the real premises when arguing.

For example, he says: “This view is too dangerous, so it is wrong.”

A premise is hidden here: Dangerous views must be false. But this premise is clearly not true. Some true things are also dangerous, such as certain facts about virus transmission, financial system risks, or war intelligence.

So ask: What premise does this conclusion depend on?

Third, is the reasoning valid?

Even if the premises are true, the conclusion is not necessarily correct.

For example: “A certain expert was wrong once before, so he must be wrong this time.” Not true.

Someone might say: “The fact that he was wrong before shows he cannot be believed solely on his status; we still have to look at the evidence this time.” This is also not quite right. His status as an expert increases the probability of him being trusted to some extent, and his frequent mistakes will lower the probability of him being trusted, but for a specific matter/conclusion itself, whether he was wrong before or whether he is an expert is irrelevant to the correctness of his conclusion.

Fourth, can counter-examples be admitted?

A logical person, when encountering a counter-example, will distinguish:

• Is this a local exception?

• Is this a definition problem?

• Is this a measurement error?

• Or does it directly overturn the core view?

An illogical person, when encountering a counter-example, usually changes the subject, attacks the person, redefines words, or says you are nitpicking.

Fifth, is there a willingness to distinguish “I don’t like it” from “it is not true”?

Many arguments fail here. “I hate this conclusion” does not equal the conclusion being wrong; a person’s bad attitude does not equal their logic being wrong. Emotion can explain your reaction, but it cannot replace an argument.

8. How to prove there is objective logic?

If one requires a kind of proof that does not rely on any rules, any premises, or any rational framework, then it is almost impossible. Because the act of “proving” itself already relies on logic.

One cannot prove logic from outside logic, just as one cannot prove that language is useful without using any language. But we can make a more fundamental explanation: as long as you are arguing, refuting, proving, or questioning, you have already defaulted to certain logical rules being valid.

For example, you say: “Logic is not objective.”

Then you are hoping others accept this proposition rather than accepting its opposite at the same time.

You have defaulted to:

You cannot simply contradict yourself.

Reasons should support the conclusion.

If the other party misunderstands you, you can point out “No, that’s not what I meant.”

If the other party says something contradictory, you can criticize them.

These behaviors all default to logical norms. So as long as you have said “this is right,” “this is wrong,” “there is no right or wrong,” or any conclusion, it proves you have already accepted a rule-based world with logic.

9. Why is “you are being stubborn” often used to terminate logic?

Because logical questioning will expose many things; it will ask: What do you mean by this word? What is the basis? Can this example represent the whole? Have you changed your standards—you just said A and now you say non-A, how can they both be true?

These questions make people uncomfortable, so many people interpret “uncomfortable” as “you are being stubborn.” In fact, it is often that his viewpoint cannot withstand continued questioning—though indeed some people do engage in meaningless pestering.

The difference between rigorous questioning and “trolling” (being a “gangjing”) is:

• Rigorous questioning is to clarify standards, generally still analyzing the problem under the basic assumptions of the previous topic or the initial topic.

• Trolling questioning generally relies on constantly and actively shifting the topic or outputting words that clearly violate basic logical rules.

10. If most people do not have rigorous logic, how to prove logic exists?

This is like asking: “If most people sing out of tune, how to prove pitch exists?”

The answer is: It is precisely because one can judge someone as being out of tune that it proves a certain standard exists.

If there were no logical standards, we couldn’t even say someone is “not being logical.” All statements would become parallel noise, impossible to compare.

But in reality, we can indeed distinguish: this argument swapped concepts, this conclusion does not follow from the premises, this statistic treats correlation as causation, this statement cannot be falsified, this definition is constantly drifting.

Can we really distinguish? Or is it that in quite a few cases, a considerable proportion of people are unable to distinguish?

Question 3: Why the lack of logical ability?

If logic has relatively objective rules, why do many people still behave illogically? Why do some people clearly not respond to the question itself yet firmly believe they are the logical party?

In my opinion, so-called “poor logical ability” should at least be divided into two categories:

1. A genuine lack of logical ability

2. Failure to use logic caused by psychological issues

Two Major Reasons

The first category is a matter of ability. A person may not have received basic reasoning training, doesn’t know how to distinguish between premises and conclusions, doesn’t know what a counter-example is, doesn’t understand the difference between correlation and causation, and doesn’t know common errors like sample bias, hasty generalization, swapping concepts, or ad hominem attacks. This type of problem is closer to cognitive ability, knowledge structure, and lack of training.

The second category is more complex. A person may not necessarily lack reasoning ability and may even be very smart in certain fields, but once a discussion touches upon his self-esteem, face, identity, core beliefs, sense of relational security, or sense of shame, his reasoning ability is suppressed by reactions from other parts of the brain. At this time, the problem is not “cannot think,” but “dare not think,” “should not think,” or “it would be too painful to think further.”

Therefore, poor logical ability is not just an intellectual problem, but also potentially a psychological pattern problem. Psychological problems will lead to poor logical ability because some people are afraid of appearing ignorant so they don’t ask questions, afraid of losing face so they don’t admit they didn’t understand, afraid of damaged self-esteem so they don’t accept feedback, and afraid of being shaken so they don’t look at opposing opinions. They clearly could admit and solve a problem, but they don’t; yet it is in this process of solving that logical and cognitive abilities truly improve.

Before studying psychology, I always found it hard to understand why many people would show completely different levels of logic and cognitive ability under different topics. After studying, I had a feeling of sudden enlightenment: when a discussion enters an area where a person has psychological issues, his defense mechanisms are placed above rational analysis, eventually manifesting as him being quite smart elsewhere but suddenly becoming “stupid” at certain times.

The following explains this mechanism using the psychological framework from my previous blog. The general process is: a viewpoint is challenged, triggering shame, anxiety, or a sense of loss of control; the brain translates “my viewpoint is wrong” into “there is something wrong with me”; the defense system is activated, and the reasoning goal switches from judging truth/falsehood to protecting oneself, thus leading to rationalization, projection, attack, belittling, shifting the topic, or moral kidnapping.

1. Basic Cognition and Orientation

A person’s logical performance is first influenced by his basic cognition and orientation.

On the surface, a discussion is about dealing with facts, evidence, and reasoning, but many times, what a person truly cares about is not “whether this proposition holds,” but rather: Do I look smart? Did I lose? Can I still maintain the persona I’ve always had? Can I still feel that I am correct and valuable? Many arguments appear to be logical issues, but at the core, they are issues of self-worth.

1.1 What does he pursue?

If a person truly pursues understanding the truth in a discussion, he will be quite willing to correct his views, because for him, discovering an error is not a failure but an instance of reflection, learning, and progress. The goal of this person’s discussion is to clear up the problem and find a more accurate explanation to bring his cognition closer to reality.

But if a person truly pursues winning, face, a sense of authority, or a moral high ground, things are completely different. On the surface, he might also be talking about logic and might even use many words that seem very rational, but his true goal is actually to protect himself—to win, to appear stronger than you, to prove he was right all along, to make you admit he is reasonable, and to avoid being placed in the position of the one being educated.

At this point, logic is no longer a tool for checking oneself, but turns into a weapon for attacking others. A truth-seeker, when encountering a disagreement, will first think “where could I be wrong,” while a defensive person will first think “how can I prove I’m not wrong.”

1.2 What is feared? What is detested?

The key psychological threat in a logical discussion is often not the fact of “I said something wrong” itself, but what “saying something wrong” represents behind it. On the surface, a person fears that this viewpoint is wrong, but deep down, they may fear: I’m not smart, I’m not valuable, I’ll be laughed at, I’ll lose authority, or the persona I’ve always held will collapse.

So some people cannot admit a very small mistake, not because the mistake itself is so serious, but because their brain translates this mistake into a deeper threat—being wrong means being stupid, not knowing means being worthless, being corrected means being humiliated, yielding means losing, and admitting a problem means the other party will press down on them.

Many people don’t just fear mistakes; they also detest being in the position of the “corrected person.” If a person binds “wrong viewpoint” with “self-worth,” any refutation will become an attack on the self, and thus he will fight back. At this point, the object of the argument is no longer the proposition, but status, self-esteem, and shame.

2. Regulatory Methods

Basic cognition and orientation determine what a person will experience as a threat, and the regulatory method determines how he handles it after being threatened. The most common emotion in logical discussions is not simple anger, but a mix of shame, anxiety, loss of control, and a sense of being negated.

When an error is pointed out, it is normal for a person to have a moderate negative feeling; one difference lies in the degree, and another difference lies in how to regulate them.

2.1 Expression: Being able to speak out emotions instead of letting them turn into attacks

A more mature person might say: I feel a bit uncomfortable with what you said, but I want to first see if the point you made holds. Or: I feel a bit negated right now and might need a moment, but you can continue stating your reasons.

This person is not without emotions, but is able to separate emotions from facts. He knows: I am uncomfortable, which does not mean you are wrong. This is a very critical ability in logical discussions.

2.2 Solution: Returning to the question itself

For example, asking: Which step of my reasoning do you think is wrong? Is there a problem with the premise, or is the conclusion drawn too far? Can you give a counter-example? This approach will lower defensiveness and let the discussion return to reason rather than becoming increasingly emotional. A person with strong logical ability is not necessarily always right, but he can locate the error in specific steps rather than turning the discussion into “who is more embarrassed.”

2.3 Acceptance: Allowing oneself to be uncomfortable when corrected

A more mature way is acceptance. A person can admit: I indeed want to be defensive right now, I don’t like being corrected, and I’m also a bit afraid of appearing stupid—but these feelings don’t mean the other party is wrong.

The reason many people cannot be logical is not because they cannot reason, but because they cannot accept the physical and emotional reactions brought about by “I might be wrong.” He must immediately eliminate this discomfort, and thus he will trigger a defense.

2.4 Avoidance: Withdrawing from the question, comfortable in the short term, more rigid in the long term

Avoidant regulation is common in expressions like: Never mind, let’s not talk about it; think whatever you want; this topic is meaningless; I can’t make it clear to you.

Sometimes stopping a discussion is reasonable, such as when both sides’ emotions are too high or the other party is indeed disrespectful. But if a person always withdraws when a core issue approaches, that is not maturity but avoidance.

The short-term benefit of avoidance is that shame and anxiety temporarily decrease, but the long-term cost is that he has no chance to discover that “admitting a mistake won’t kill you,” “being corrected does not equal being destroyed,” and “discussing a problem does not mean my whole being is negated.”

2.5 Defense: Replacing argument with psychological defense

The most common is defensive regulation. When a person cannot bear the feeling of being negated, they will use defense mechanisms instead of arguments. Common methods include: rationalization (there is a reason I said that), projection (clearly you are the one without logic), belittling (what’s the use of you reading so many books?), moral kidnapping (you being so serious means you are not kind), and shifting the topic (talk about whether you have problems first). The common point of these methods is that they no longer deal with the proposition itself, but are dealing with psychological threats.

For example, if the original question is “Does this experiment have a control group?”, a defensive answer would become “Why do you always negate others?” “How many experiments do you understand?” “You being so serious is very tiring.” These words might have information at the relationship level, but they do not answer the original question. Much of so-called “illogic” is essentially using defense mechanisms to replace arguments.

Narcissistic Defense

Narcissistic defense is a big topic; I will only briefly introduce one typical manifestation: replacing arguments with unrealistic boasting.

Others ask: What is your evidence?

His answer will be:

I am ***, how could I not understand this?

I saw through it long ago.

It’s too simple; I don’t deign to do it.

I have experienced much more than you.

Your view is too shallow.

This is not something at your level that can be understood.

Logically speaking, this is treating “I am very powerful” as an argument. But no matter how powerful a person is, it cannot automatically guarantee that every sentence he says is right. Seniority, experience, and status can only influence whether others are willing to listen to you; they cannot replace evidence and reasoning.

The more exaggerated and unrealistic the boasting, the more it indicates that behind it is defense rather than confidence. A person with genuine confidence does not need to repeatedly prove they are superior; they just need to explain the reasons clearly; if they cannot explain clearly, they admit they still need to think.

Narcissistic defense cannot do this. It must first elevate itself (or a group it belongs to) and press others down, letting the viewpoint appear correct by virtue of this height.

3. Formation Mechanism

This pattern doesn’t come out of nowhere. It usually comes from a combination of biological foundations, early relationships, later experiences, and social culture.

3.1 Biological Foundations

Some people may naturally be more prone to anxiety, more impulsive, find it harder to bear uncertainty, or find it harder to maintain cognitive control when emotions are high. This makes complex reasoning more tiring, makes emotions flare up more easily, and makes it easier to interpret differing opinions as threats.

This is not destiny, but it will affect a person’s initial level of difficulty. Faced with the same refutation, some people are only slightly uncomfortable, while others immediately enter strong defense. Biological foundations may be part of the reason.

3.2 Early Relationships & Later Experiences

Early relationships have a great impact on how a person experiences “errors.” If a person was often treated this way when young—being humiliated for making mistakes, mocked for asking questions, suppressed for talking back to parents, held onto for admitting mistakes, and only being loved for being “sensible” and “correct”—and later reinforced (being publicly mocked for a wrong answer in school, being blamed after admitting a mistake in the workplace, or being attacked by everyone on the internet for admitting a mistake), he is likely to form such deep-seated predictions: making mistakes leads to humiliation, yielding means losing, the other party will take the opportunity to attack if a mistake is admitted, and exposing deficiencies leads to being looked down upon.

After such a person grows up, it is very difficult for them to easily admit a mistake. It’s not that he is naturally unreasonable, but that the psychological mechanism he formed equates “admitting a mistake” with danger. In this psychological structure, logical discussion is not a shared exploration, but rather the person raising logical questions is seen as being sick.

3.3 Indirect Influence of Social Culture

Social culture will affect the worldviews and psychological problems of parents, teachers, and leaders, thereby indirectly affecting our psychological problems, and this phenomenon of anti-logic, anti-science, and anti-criticism is deeply rooted in our culture and education.

Nowadays, we carry forward traditional culture to enhance national confidence while also emphasizing innovation. This itself is not contradictory; the contradiction is: on one hand, sanctifying traditional thoughts and viewing questioning tradition as disrespect; on the other hand, demanding independent thinking, technological innovation, and breaking through old frameworks.

Carrying forward should be about taking the essence and discarding the dregs. True confidence is calmly admitting one’s own problems and having confidence formed during continuous progress. We respect tradition out of respect for the contributions tradition made in the historical environment at that time, rather than treating “the wisdom of ancestors” as absolute truth.

(1) “The laws of the ancestors cannot be changed”: Questioning is not equal to disrespect

Respecting tradition does not mean tradition is always correct. Tradition may contain long-term experience, or it may contain historical limitations. A rigorous attitude should ask: What problem did this tradition solve? Have the conditions changed now? What is the cost? Is there a better alternative?

But people who believe “the laws of the ancestors cannot be changed” will only say: It has always been like this, passed down from the old ancestors, what right do you have to change it?

The biggest problem with this kind of statement is conflating “historical contribution” with “present correctness.” “Existing for a long time” does not equal “still being reasonable now.” The fact that many things have existed for a long time only shows they have historical reasons; it cannot automatically show they have legitimacy. If a society treats “old” itself as “right,” then innovation, reflection, and error correction will all be regarded as dangerous. Then how can it innovate?

The West also respects Aristotle. He had a major impact on logic, biology, ethics, and politics, but this did not prevent later generations from pointing out that many of his natural philosophy views were wrong—some of his judgments about the motion of objects, the structure of celestial bodies, and the classification of life were later replaced by new observations and theories. Admitting these errors does not erase Aristotle’s historical status. The same goes for Newton; relativity and quantum mechanics extended and corrected Newtonian mechanics, the latter of which can be seen as an approximation theory under low-speed, weak-gravity, and macroscopic scales. No one would interpret Einstein’s proposal of relativity as “disrespecting Newton,” right?

Our attitude toward the I Ching and Traditional Chinese Medicine should also be like this—we can recognize their historical contributions, but we don’t have to continue treating them as absolute truths that are beyond question and must be unconditionally promoted. Admitting that some of their specific claims have been corrected by modern evidence is not betraying ancestors; it is precisely the continuation of the spirit of reflection and innovation. Hard-packaging inferiority as “confidence” and ignoring facts and logic to maintain a set of conclusions is not true confidence; it is defensive narcissism.

(2) “Ruler as ruler, subject as subject”: Do those above have mandatory interpretative power?

Originally, “order” was not necessarily anti-logic; any society needs roles and responsibilities. But once it transforms into “people in high positions are more qualified to define facts, people with great power speak words closer to the truth, and questioning by those below is crossing the line,” it starts to become anti-logic. Because the basic premise of a logical discussion is: a proposition does not hold because the speaker’s status is high, nor is it invalid because the speaker’s status is low.

The hierarchy structure will change this premise to: Whether you are qualified to speak is more important than whether what you say is right. For example, one often hears in school “Just remember what the teacher said,” “Don’t be a nitpicker,” and “This won’t be on the exam.” Over time, people do not ask first “whether the reason holds,” but ask first “who said it.” In such an environment, logical ability is naturally difficult to develop—if one must assume that what ancients, teachers, seniors, and leaders say is all correct, how can the younger generation innovate?

(3) “Father as father, son as son”: Does not mean filial piety equals obedience

“Filial piety” could originally be understood as care, gratitude, responsibility, and emotional connection, but in reality, it is often equated with obedience. Once filial piety is interpreted as obedience, the independent judgment of children will be morally suppressed—“I am your parents, so what I say is for your own good,” “You’re just a kid, why so many whys,” “If you disagree with your parents, you’re unfilial,” “If you talk sense, you don’t understand your parents’ hard work.”

The most fatal thing here is that it translates a fact/logic problem into a moral problem. The child is originally saying “the reason for this matter does not hold,” but what the parents hear is “you don’t love me, you don’t respect me, you are unfilial,” so the discussion ends immediately. This type of structure will cause a person to form a deep fear: proposing a different opinion is hurting the relationship, insisting on logic is betraying family ties, and refuting parents is equivalent to being a bad person.

Over time, people lose a very important ability: maintaining love while also maintaining judgment. They either obey or explode; either stay silent or tear apart; it is very hard for them to “respect you but disagree with your judgment on this matter.” Emphasizing filial piety in society can increase understanding and respect for the elderly, but it can also turn into a structure of obedience in some realistic relationships. As individuals, especially as parents, one needs to carefully think about the harm of this power.

(4) “Harmony is precious”: Does not mean not facing contradictions to maintain surface harmony

“Harmony” could originally be a very high value: reducing unnecessary conflict, pursuing coexistence, and avoiding destructive confrontation. But in reality, it is often downgraded to “don’t talk about it,” “that’s enough,” “don’t make everyone embarrassed,” and “why do you have to distinguish right from wrong?”.

How many statements about right and wrong have people who don’t let others distinguish right and wrong expressed in their own lives? This double standard is everywhere. If things are not cleared up, there won’t be true harmony, only a fake harmony. Logical discussions often need to point out contradictions: your premise and conclusion are inconsistent, your statements before and after conflict, a concept was swapped here. But the low-level version of “harmony is precious” will interpret all these as destroying the relationship—pointing out a contradiction is called creating a contradiction, requiring clarity is called not knowing how to be smooth, and requiring evidence is called not giving face.

In the long run, people will misunderstand “logical clarity” as “cold-heartedness” and “vague muddling” as “mature and sensible.”

(5) “Saving face for others”: But error correction is not equal to slapping one’s face

Face culture is particularly harmful to logical discussions. Logical discussions need to admit “I was wrong here,” “your evidence here is insufficient,” and “this step of reasoning jumped,” but face culture translates all these operations into making it hard for someone to step down, slapping their face in public, or intentional humiliation.

For a normal person, it is easy to distinguish between humiliation and relatively objective and calm pointing out of an error; but for someone with serious psychological problems, the latter will also be interpreted as humiliation.

Consequently, in order to save face, one person will avoid pointing out problems; to save face, another person will refuse to admit problems. Both sides are protecting face, while the problem itself is handled by no one.

If being corrected is equated with losing face, admitting an error is equated with losing face, and insisting on questioning is called not giving face, then the problem arises: the basic action of logic is “error correction”—once error correction is stigmatized, logic can only exist in trivial topics and “fails” as soon as it hits real people and real things.

(6) “The bird that sticks its head out gets shot”: Punishing the questioner and the dissenter

The development of logical ability requires public expression, trial and error, and feedback. But an environment where “the bird that sticks its head out gets shot” teaches people: don’t be the first to speak, don’t express different opinions, don’t challenge the consensus, and don’t ask questions that make everyone embarrassed.

This suppresses critical thinking. Critical thinking is not enough if one just thinks it secretly in one’s heart; it needs to be spoken out, responded to, refuted, and corrected. If a person is afraid of “sticking their head out” for a long time, they will reduce expression; with less expression and less feedback, logical ability grows slowly. Finally, everyone learns safe rhetoric such as “everyone says so,” “the leader is right,” and “I have no opinion.” But then how can one innovate?

(7) Abuse of “The Mean” (Zhongyong)

True “Mean” is not about being a “mud-mixer” (making compromises regardless of right or wrong); it is a proper judgment in a specific situation, requiring very high judgment. But the low-level version of “The Mean” often turns into giving each side fifty strokes of the cane, saying everyone is reasonable, not taking sides, not saying who is wrong, and not speaking clearly. This leads to a kind of “pseudo-maturity”: it looks very balanced, but in fact, there is no judgment.

Logical thinking is not always about standing in the middle. Sometimes the middle is right, sometimes one side’s evidence is clearly stronger, and sometimes a certain view is just wrong. If a person mistakes “neutrality” for “rationality,” he will escape judgment; to forcibly say “everyone is reasonable” when there is a clear difference in the strength of evidence is not being objective.

A more rigorous attitude is to ask: Which side’s evidence and premises are more reliable? Which side can explain more facts? Which side can better respond to counter-examples?

(8) What is called patriotism?

True patriotism is not afraid of pointing out problems, because one wants the community to become better, and one’s actions are more conducive to the long-term healthy development of this society.

True traditional identity is not afraid of questioning, because one knows that tradition is originally something that is constantly being questioned, understood, and updated.

Blind patriotism and blind maintenance of tradition are not true confidence, but group narcissistic defense.

People with group narcissistic defense imagine the group they belong to as a perfect whole that cannot go wrong, cannot be questioned, and cannot be compared. Criticism will be seen as an attack, reflection will be seen as betrayal, and admitting a problem will be seen as losing face.

Only with group narcissistic defense will patriotism be turned into shielding shortcomings and respect for tradition be turned into forbidding questioning. Quite a few of these people are actually double-standard in reality; they emphasize tradition, order, collective, and responsibility with their mouths, but when they encounter their own interests, they immediately switch to a different set of standards, and their actual actions harm the long-term healthy development of society. Ultimately, this leads to: whoever can shout slogans better appears more correct, while whoever is more willing to point out specific problems is instead more easily put on trial.

4. Lack of logical training and psychological defense reinforce each other

Lack of logical ability and psychological defense are not completely separate; they reinforce each other. A person lacking logical training is more likely to make mistakes in a discussion; the more mistakes they make, the more likely their problems will be pointed out; if they then interpret having problems pointed out as shame, they will become more defensive; the more defensive they are, the less willing they are to learn logic, resulting in continued mistakes.

References

• Introduction to Logic by Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen, Victor Rodych